Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets by Rowe, Elizabeth A
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2009
Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade
Secrets
Elizabeth A. Rowe
University of Florida Levin College of Law, rowe@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1 (2009), available at
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/89
2009]
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
TRADE SECRETS
Elizabeth A. Rowe*
INTRODUCTION
In tort law, the doctrine of contributory negligence captures conduct
by the plaintiff that falls below the standard to which he should conform for
his own protection.' Whether one has been contributorily negligent is de-
termined by an objective standard of reasonableness under the circum-
stances.' This Article, for the first time, applies contributory negligence
principles to trade secret law.' It draws upon this doctrine to frame and ana-
lyze a challenge posed by modem technology. The very technological tools
in use today that increase the efficiency with which companies do business
also create challenges for trade secret protection. The same tools that make
trade secrets easier to store, easier to access, easier to disseminate, and
more portable, also increase the risks that trade secrets will be destroyed.
According to a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the
mobility of trade secrets makes them "one of the country's most vulnerable
economic assets."4 Many well-known companies such as Apple Inc., Cater-
pillar Inc., Charles Schwab Corp., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Est~e
Lauder Cosmetics Ltd., Four Seasons Hotels, Inc., and Hewlett-Packard Co.
have all recently been litigants in trade secret misappropriation cases where
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. I am grateful to Bill
Page, Michael Risch, Jeff Childers, and Lea Johnston for their comments or conversations about earlier
drafts of this work. I also thank, for their comments, participants at (1) the Feist, Facts, and Fiction
Conference at George Washington University Law School, (2) a faculty workshop at Case Western
University Reserve Law School sponsored by the Center for Law Technology and the Arts, and (3) the
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference held at Cardozo School of Law. For research assistance, I am
very grateful to Alicia Phillip, Mi Zhou, and Abbey Morrow. Finally, thank you to the University of
Florida, Levin College of Law, for its research support.
I KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 144 (3d ed. 2007).
2 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 464(1) (1965).
3 A few scholars have briefly discussed these or similar tort concepts in relation to other areas of
intellectual property. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enable-
ment of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1604-07 (2005) (discussing contributory negli-
gence, comparative negligence, and assumption of risk as possible defenses to a negligent security claim
against software companies); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and its Alternatives in
Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 821 (2002) (discussing a strict liability framework in the
patent law context).
4 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2009, at 40 (2004),
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/strategicplanfull.pdf.
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the alleged misappropriation involved the use of technological tools to
transfer the trade secret information.5
As a general matter, trade secret law protects valuable business infor-
mation and inventions more easily and inexpensively than patent protec-
tion.6 Modem trade secret law simply requires that the information be of
value and that it be kept secret.7 Secrecy is thus the sine qua non of trade
secret protection,8 but it can be difficult to accomplish. Because the final
determination of whether information is entitled to trade secret protection is
not made until the trade secret owner is in litigation, courts, in an ex post
fashion, second-guess whether the owner did enough to keep the informa-
tion secret.9 Thus, at a fundamental level, "the extent of the property right
[in a trade secret] is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret
protects his interest from disclosure to others."'"
The doctrinal lens through which a court evaluates the sufficiency of a
trade secret owner's protection measures is the "reasonable efforts" re-
quirement." The question becomes: did the putative trade secret owner take
reasonable efforts to protect the trade secret? While absolute secrecy is not
required, the trade secret owner is expected to show that it took efforts rea-
sonable under the circumstances to protect the secret. 2 This standard is very
flexible, and intuitively necessitates a fact-intensive case-by-case determi-
nation that considers a host of factors in trying to ascertain reasonableness. 3
5 Hiawatha Bray, Website to be Closed as Part of Deal with Apple, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21,
2007, at 4E; Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (S.D.
Fla. 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Four Seasons Hotels v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 138 F.
App'x 297 (1lth Cir. 2005); Caterpillar Inc. v. Sturman Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Charles Schwab & Co. v. Karpiak, No. 06-4010, 2007 WL 136743 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2007); Metcalf v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 05-1035 (MJD/SRN), 2006 WL 1877069 (D. Minn. July 6, 2006);
Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Byd:Sign,
Inc., No. 6:05-CV-456, 2007 WL 275476 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2007).
6 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 371,400-01 (2002).
7 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
8 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("Information that is public
knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret."); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) ("The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be
of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business."); MBL (USA) Corp. v. Dick-
man, 445 N.E.2d 418,425 (111. App. Ct. 1983).
9 See In re Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 1986) ("An indispensable
element of a trade-secrets claim is that the information, for which legal protection is sought, be genu-
inely secret.").
10 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002.
II See infra Part I.B.
12 See, e.g., MBL (USA) Corp., 445 N.E.2d at 425-26 (reviewing plaintiff's security measures and
finding that such measures were insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a protectable trade secret).
13 See infra Part I.B.3.
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It is, however, at the heart of every trade secret misappropriation case and
often determines the outcome. 4
This Article explores a question previously unaddressed in the litera-
ture: should the greater risks presented to trade secrets in a digital world
change the way that courts evaluate reasonable efforts when a trade secret is
misappropriated using some form of computer technology? Should reason-
ableness be pegged to a "should have known" standard such that courts
impute an objective expectation (similar to a contributory negligence de-
termination) that higher safety precautions will be utilized because of the
risks that in today's digital world trade secrets are easier to access and dis-
seminate? Because the reasonable efforts requirement necessitates consid-
eration of what is reasonable under the circumstances, I argue that the
changing circumstances that have come about as a result of new technology
require a reexamination of what security measures are reasonable. As such,
the changing landscape indirectly places a higher duty of care on trade se-
cret owners since the increased risks from technology are foreseeable. At a
normative level, reasonableness requires not necessarily a checklist of spe-
cific items, but a conscious, risk assessment approach that better anticipates
and ultimately stems the inappropriate dissemination or disclosure of the
secrets. While this seems intuitive, the courts' approach and outcomes in
these kinds of cases have been inconsistent. 5 Accordingly, I propose guide-
lines that infuse a more meaningful objective standard into the reasonable
efforts analysis. 6
This approach is informed and supported by contributory negligence
principles that consider the plaintiffs conduct relative to the reasonably
prudent person. 7 Where the plaintiff is in a better position than the defen-
dant to decide whether to risk being injured, or at least the extent of that
risk, based on the precautions it selects, then it seems sensible to allocate
the burden of that choice to the plaintiff." It is also entirely consistent with
14 Enter. Leasing Co. v. Ehmke, 3 P.3d 1064, 1070 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) ("Indeed, the most
important factor in gaining trade secret protection is demonstrating that the owner has taken such pre-
cautions as are reasonable under the circumstances to preserve the secrecy of the information." (citing
Michael A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information, 43 BUS. LAW. 887, 895
(1988))).
15 See infra Part l.B.
16 See infra Part III.A.
17 See RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 267 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Wis. 1978) ("Where the owner of the
secret disregards caution and fails to take steps to safeguard against disclosure, the courts will, at times,
deny him any relief whatever, principally on the theory that he courted his own disaster." (quoting
RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 55.1 (3d
ed. 1968))). The standard for trade secret misappropriation is closer to negligence than to an intentional
tort. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, for instance, defines misappropriation, in part, as "acquisition of a
trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired
by improper means." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
18 ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 164-65 (discussing conscious reasonable risk-taking).
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trade secret doctrine as it currently exists, which requires that trade secret
owners take reasonable precautions to protect their trade secrets as a pre-
requisite for proving that a defendant (regardless of his conduct) misappro-
priated the trade secret.' 9 This is especially powerful where such reasonable
efforts are necessary for determining whether a trade secret exists in the
first instance and because modem trade secret law is derived, at least in
part, from tort law principles."°
Part I of this Article provides some relevant background on trade
secret law and the "reasonable efforts" requirement. Part II introduces the
digital world and the way in which electronic technology affects how we
store, access, and disseminate trade secrets. In Part III, the Article urges
courts to give special consideration to the known technological risks that a
trade secret owner may or may not consider, rather than continuing to focus
on traditional facilities-based measures.2 The Article proposes guidelines
for judges and fact finders doing the reasonable efforts analysis that
includes consideration of such factors as (1) the nature of the industry; (2)
the nature of the trade secrets and how they were stored; (3) the nature of
the measures taken to protect the secrets; and (4) the known risks from
storage and protection choices. Accordingly, the framework proposed here
should infuse greater consistency and objectivity into digital
misappropriation cases, 22 which are likely to constitute the bulk of trade
secret misappropriation cases within the next few years. Part IV places the
challenge of protecting trade secret information in the larger context of data
security and discusses the lessons that can be learned from that parallel
struggle. The Article concludes that trade secret protection cannot be an
afterthought. Rather, in order to be reasonable, trade secret protection
requires a more conscious, risk assessment approach that better anticipates
and ultimately stems the inappropriate dissemination or disclosure of the
secrets.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 36-41.
20 Trade secret law in this country was first synthesized and published in the Restatement (First)
of Torts, and it may very well be that the reasonable efforts standard derived from the tort law underpin-
nings of this area of law. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmts. a, g (1939).
21 See infra Part 1.B.I.
22 1 use this phrase to refer to circumstances when trade secret misappropriation occurs, at least in
part, using electronic or digital means.
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I. THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT
United States publicly traded companies own an estimated five trillion
dollars in trade secret information. 23 Trade secrets are important to busi-
nesses of all sizes, from the smallest operations to the largest multi-national
entities.24 Trade secrets are often a company's most valuable intangible
assets,25 and a company's survival may depend on its ability to protect its
trade secrets. In the digital age, securing information can be especially
daunting because once a trade secret has been disclosed, even if inadver-
tently, it ceases to be a trade secret.26
A trade secret can be any information of value used in one's business
that has been kept secret and provides an economic advantage over com-
petitors. 27 The wide range of information that is entitled to trade secret pro-
tection includes customer lists, costs, sales records, customer information,
marketing strategies, secret contract terms, unpublished pricing informa-
tion, and chemical formulas.2 Trade secrets sometimes encompass a major-
ity of a company's assets,29 and prior to obtaining patent protection, virtu-
ally all inventions are covered by trade secret protection.3" The reasonable
efforts requirement is probably the most important factor in determining
whether a trade secret holder owns a protectable trade secret.3'
23 See John P. Hutchins, The Corporation's Valuable Assets: IP Rights under SOX, in 26TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW 289, 292 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Hand-
book Series No. G-859, 2006).
24 See generally id.; ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 34-35 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the importance of trade secrets to small compa-
nies).
25 R. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, BRIEFLY... PERSP.
ON LEG. REG. & LITIG., Oct. 2001, at 7.
26 while the risk of loss is one that is inherent in choosing this form of protection, it does not
necessarily suggest that a trade secret owner should have instead chosen patent protection. The choice of
trade secret protection or patent protection must be based on a very careful assessment of the particular
information involved and thorough consideration of business and legal factors involving, for example,
the nature of the information, the ease with which it can be reverse engineered, and the feasibility and
cost of obtaining patent protection. See generally Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 6. Accordingly, one
who chooses trade secret protection over patent protection has not necessarily forgone a "better" form of
protection, especially since there is a wide range of information that is eligible for trade secret protection
but not patent protection. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 3.01 [1 ][a] (1997).
27 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (1995).
28 See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1265-70 (7th Cir. 1995); ConAgra, Inc. v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 725, 728-30 (Ark. 2000); McFarland v. Brier, No. C.A. 96-1007, 1998
WL 269223, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 13, 1998), vacated, 769 A.2d 605 (R.I. 2001).
29 Hutchins, supra note 23, at 291-92.
30 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989).
31 See, e.g., MBL (USA) Corp. v. Diekman, 445 N.E.2d 418,425 (I11. App. Ct. 1983) ("Although
many factors should be considered to determine if a trade secret exists, what is of primary importance is
GEO. MASON L. REv.
A. Sources of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement
Trade secret law is governed by state law, and the manner in which the
reasonable efforts requirement enters into a trade secret misappropriation
analysis is determined by the source of trade secret law followed by that
state.32 As this subpart will illustrate, whether the state follows the Restate-
ment of Torts, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"), or the Restate-
ment of Unfair Competition, the reasonable efforts33 requirement is an im-
portant part of the analysis in every trade secret case. As a general matter,
the two main legal questions in a trade secret case are first, whether the
plaintiff owns a legally protectable trade secret and, if so, second, whether
the defendant misappropriated it.34
In almost every state, the reasonable efforts requirement is embedded
in the threshold legal question of the misappropriation analysis: whether the
plaintiff owns a legally protectable trade secret. 5 The UTSA, which has
been adopted by forty-six states and the District of Columbia,36 includes
reasonable efforts as part of the definition of a trade secret.37 Reasonable
efforts require that in order to qualify for trade secret protection, the infor-
mation must be "the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy."38 The states that have not adopted the
UTSA rely on the older codification of trade secret law in the Restatement
of Torts.39 However, even the Restatement of Torts requires a trade secret
holder to show more than mere intent to protect something as a trade secret;
actual effort to keep the information secret is necessary.4" Thus, the Re-
statement of Torts includes "the extent of measures taken by [the trade se-
cret owner] to guard the secrecy of the information" as one of six factors to
'whether and how an employer acts to keep the information secret."' (quoting Lincoln Towers Ins.
Agency v. Farrell, 425 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981))).
32 Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 6
(2007).
33 Id. at 42-52.
34 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (prefatory note) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) ("For
liability to exist under this Act, a... trade secret must exist and either a person's acquisition of the trade
secret, disclosure of the trade secret to others, or use of the trade secret must be improper . .
35 Risch, supra note 32, at 6-7.
36 Unif. Law Comm'rs, A Few Facts About the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, http://www.nccusl.org
/Update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
37 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (4)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
38 See id.
39 See POOLEY,supra note 26, §§ 2.02[3], 2.04[3].
40 Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983) ("[E]ven
under the common law, more than an 'intention' was required-the plaintiff was required to show that it
had manifested that intention by making some effort to keep the information secret.").
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be considered in determining whether information qualifies as a trade se-
cret.4
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition has supplanted the Re-
statement of Torts in codifying the common law of trade secrets.42 Unlike
the UTSA and the Restatement of Torts, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition does not include reasonable efforts in defining a trade secret.43
Rather, the determination of reasonable efforts is part of the second ques-
tion in the misappropriation analysis, focusing on whether the defendant
misappropriated the trade secret." In determining whether a defendant's
acquisition of a trade secret was improper, the Restatement (Third) of Un-
fair Competition calls for an evaluation of "the extent to which the acquisi-
tion was facilitated by the trade secret owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions against discovery of the secret by the means in question."4 The
Restatement further suggests that the "foreseeability of the conduct through
which the secret was acquired" should be relevant to determining reason-
ableness.46 This principle from the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion, although different from the UTSA's formulation for determining the
ultimate question of misappropriation, nonetheless supports this Article's
premise that a trade secret owner's failure to guard against foreseeable
technological incursions should bar recovery."
41 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The remaining five factors are: "(1) the
extent to which the information is known outside of [the] business; (2) the extent to which it is known
by employees and others involved in [the] business; ... (4) the value of the information to [the business]
and to [its] competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by [the business] in developing the
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or dupli-
cated by others." Id.
42 When the Restatement (Second) of Torts was published in 1979, the reporters decided that trade
secret law was best addressed under the principles of unfair competition law rather than tort law, and
therefore omitted it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS div. 9, introductory note (1979). In 1995, trade
secret law was restated in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, and those rules are intended to
apply to both common law actions and actions under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 reporters' note (1995).
43 Rather, it defines a trade secret as "any information that can be used in the operation of a busi-
ness or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential eco-
nomic advantage over others." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). The
comment to this section notes, however, that "precautions taken to maintain the secrecy of information
are relevant in determining whether the information qualifies for protection as a trade secret," but "if the
value and secrecy of the information are clear, evidence of specific precautions taken by the trade secret
owner may be unnecessary." Id. at cmt. g.
44 Id. at cmt. f.
45 Id. § 43 cmt. c.
46 id.
47 To some extent, this premise bears some similarity to Guido Calabresi's least-cost-avoider
approach in law and economics theory, because it requires the court to assign loss to the trade secret
owner, the party who was in a better position to take optimal precautions, partly to incentivize this and
other trade secret owners to take better precautions in the future. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135, 155 (1970). While Calabresi's analysis of finding the least-cost-avoider is
GEO. MASON L. REV.
Similar to the UTSA, the Economic Espionage Act ("EEA"), the fed-
eral criminal trade secret statute, also includes a reasonable efforts require-
ment in defining a trade secret.48 The EEA requires that "the owner thereof
has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret."49 This pro-
vision withstood a void for vagueness challenge, with the court finding that
the term "reasonable measures" is not unconstitutionally vague.5" As a re-
sult, apart from the perennial difficulty in nailing down the definition of
"reasonable," for the purposes of this Article we need not quibble about the
use of a reasonable efforts standard. Since courts continue to rely on the
Restatement of Torts, and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is
applicable in both UTSA and non-UTSA jurisdictions,5' the reasonable ef-
forts requirement appears securely grounded in trade secret jurisprudence.
In sum, the modem view of trade secret law under the UTSA (and the
EEA) makes the reasonable efforts requirement a separate requirement for
secrecy, whereas the alternative common law view in the Restatements
includes it as evidence of secrecy. Normatively, it makes sense to treat the
reasonable efforts requirement as a separate requirement because it encour-
ages courts and litigants to filter out those putative trade secrets whose
value is only recognized by the plaintiff after the alleged misappropriation
occurs.52 In addition, it helps clarify that secrecy is a requirement separate
from the requirement that the information not be generally known.53 As a
practical matter, treating reasonable efforts as a requirement provides con-
sistency to the definition of a trade secret, and preserves the evidentiary
importance of steps to protect the secret in trade secret litigation.54
B. Principles from the Case Law
While the above sources of law provide the underpinning for the rea-
sonable efforts requirement, they do not provide precise standards to the
much more complex than this, and this Article does not approach the problem from a law and economics
perspective, it is worth noting the strands of overlap with the essence of his theory.
48 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2000).
49 Id.
50 United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
51 Many courts, in both UTSA and non-UTSA jurisdictions, continue to rely on and cite to the
Restatement (First) of Torts. POOLEY, supra note 26, § 2.02[3] n.12.
52 But see Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REv. 311, 349-50 (2008) (arguing that reasonable efforts should not be used as a separate
requirement, but as evidence of secrecy).
53 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) ("The subject of a trade secret
must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or busi-
ness.").
54 See infra Parts I.B.1-3.
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courts on how to determine whether the requirement has been met.5 The
interpretation of the requirement appears to be similar in all jurisdictions
such that for the purposes of this Article no further distinctions are neces-
sary between UTSA and non-UTSA states. Whether a trade secret owner
has utilized appropriate safeguards sufficient to meet the reasonable efforts
requirement is a question of fact, based on the particular circumstances.56
These decisions necessitate a balancing between using sufficient precau-
tions to protect a company's secret on the one hand, while not imposing
overly-burdensome precautions that would impair the functioning of its
business on the other hand.57 The inquiry necessarily calls for a cost-benefit
analysis, which varies in each case based on the costs of the protective
measures relative to the attendant benefits of protecting the information. 8
The costs to the trade secret owner will not only include direct financial
costs, but also indirect costs, such as the ability to make appropriate use of
the information in the business by sharing it with employees and others who
need to use it. 9
1. Relative, Not Perfect, Secrecy Required
It is clear that reasonable efforts do not require absolute secrecy.6"
Rather, the standard is one of relative secrecy; a trade secret owner needs to
take steps that are reasonably necessary under the circumstances to main-
tain secrecy." The plaintiff must take affirmative steps and show concrete
efforts to preserve the confidentiality of the alleged secret information.62
Some courts note, for example, that in addition to requiring employees to
sign confidentiality agreements, "reasonable efforts" can include "advising
employees of the existence of a trade secret, limiting access to the informa-
tion on a 'need to know basis,' ... and keeping secret documents under
55 See Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth Amendment
Analogy, 106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 462 (1992).
56 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1991).
57 See id at 178-80.
58 See id at 179.
59 Id. at 180.
60 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); see also Sheets v.
Yamaha Motors Corp., 849 F.2d 179, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1988); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Quest Software,
Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 688, 696 (N.D. 111. 2004) (noting that the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, which is based
on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, requires "reasonable measures, not perfection").
61 Sheets, 849 F.2d at 183.
62 See, e.g., Niemi v. Am. Axle Mfr. & Holding, Inc., No. 269155, 2007 WL 29383, at *4 (Mich.
Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2007) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, and finding that plaintiff did
not take concrete efforts to preserve the confidentiality of designs by, for instance, failing to mark the
documents as confidential or requiring confidentiality agreements); Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279,
1284 (Vt. 2001) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant where there was "no evidence in the
record that plaintiff took any measures to indicate that the customer list was confidential").
GEO. MASON L. REV.
lock."63 The use of security guards, closed-circuit television monitors, ac-
cess codes for information stored on a computer, and varying security ac-
cess levels for different areas of the facilities have also proven reasonable.'
For ease of reference, this Article refers to these efforts as traditional facili-
ties-based measures (vis-A-vis technical measures and processes).
2. Inferences Regarding Value and Improper Means
Efforts to protect secrecy are also tied to the requirement that trade se-
crets have value and, indeed, whether or not a company took adequate steps
to protect a secret is evidence of the subjective belief that the information
was a trade secret and thus worthy of protection.65 Some courts may reason
that there is a direct relationship between the value of the information and
the extent to which the company made efforts to protect it such that the
more valuable the information to the company, the more costly or extensive
the measures ought to be to protect it.66 Moreover, where a plaintiff makes a
strong showing of reasonable efforts to protect trade secret information, a
court is also more likely to infer that the defendant used improper means to
obtain the information.67 However, a trade secret owner who is lax about
taking precautions to prevent the secret from escaping cannot expect to bar
others from using it.6" Thus, a court may use the reasonable efforts require-
ment to deny a plaintiff any protection under trade secret law.6" As one
court aptly noted:
63 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1253
(N.D. Cal. 1995); Twin Vision Corp. v. BellSouth Commc'n Sys., Inc., 152 F.3d 929, 1998 WL 385135
(9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); see also Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp.
661, 693-94 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
64 Schalk v. State, 767 5W.2d 441, 447-48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 823 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).
65 Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1986) (reasoning
that secrecy measures constitute evidence probative of existence of a trade secret).
66 Jermaine S. Grubbs, Comment, Give the Little Guys Equal Opportunity at Trade Secret Protec-
tion: Why the "Reasonable Efforts" Taken by Small Businesses Should be Analyzed Less Stringently, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 421,426 (2005).
67 Id. at 427; Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991)
("The greater the precautions that [plaintiff] took to maintain the secrecy of the piece part drawings, the
lower the probability that [defendant] obtained them properly and the higher the probability that it
obtained them through a wrongful act ... ").
68 See, e.g., Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 196 (1 st Cir. 1980)
(where plaintiff carelessly left customer data at customer's store, competitor who accidentally discov-
ered it should not be enjoined); Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d
1053, 1056-57, 1063 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that defendant's use of consumer list could not be enjoined
when plaintiff left the file in an old computer that was subsequently sold).
69 See, e.g., Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1284 (Vt. 2001) ("It would be anomalous for the
courts to prohibit the use of information that the rightful owner did not undertake to protect.").
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[i]f [plaintiff] expended only paltry resources on preventing its... drawings from falling into
the hands of competitors . . . , why should the law, whose machinery is far from costless,
bother to provide [plaintiff] with a remedy? The information contained in the drawings can-
not have been worth much if [plaintiff] did not think it worthwhile to make serious efforts to
keep the information secret.
70
Indeed, even when a plaintiff creates a trade secret protection plan, which
provides for how the secrets will be safeguarded, but fails to adequately
follow it, a court could find such conduct to be unreasonable vis-a-vis the
hypothetical reasonable person.7'
3. Evidence of Reasonable Efforts
In practice, the question of whether the reasonable efforts requirement
has been met necessarily varies from case to case. 72 The plaintiff must pro-
duce sufficient evidence to prove that the alleged trade secret was the sub-
ject of reasonable efforts to protect its secrecy.73 The language the courts
use is not always consistent, but courts often look for the use of the follow-
ing kinds of security measures in assessing reasonableness: (1) confidential-
ity agreements; (2) exit interviews reminding departing employees of their
confidentiality obligations; (3) security badges to enter the premises or se-
cured areas; (4) security guards and closed-circuit television cameras; and
(5) computer passwords or access codes restricting access to certain per-
sonnel.74 Even where a trade secret owner implements security measures
internally with employees, it must also be mindful of external protections,
such as with customers and vendors, and failure to do so could lead to a
court denying trade secret protection.75
70 Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 179.
71 See Gemisys Corp. v. Phoenix Am., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 551, 558, 567 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (granting
summary judgment in favor of defendant licensee where plaintiff failed to use confidentiality legends on
documents pursuant to the terms of its license agreement).
72 See supra notes 56-59.
73 See, e.g., Gillis Associated Indus., Inc. v. Cari-All, Inc., 564 N.E.2d 881, 886 (I11. App. Ct.
1990) (finding that plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence of affirmative measures to keep its
customer list secret).
74 Schalk v. State, 823 S.W.2d 633, 637-40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Gillis Associated, 564 N.E.2d
at 886 (finding that plaintiff failed to take such affirmative measures as using intemal or external physi-
cal security, confidentiality agreements, confidentiality stamps, or entrance and exit interviews impart-
ing the importance of confidentiality). See also Otis Elevator Co. v. Intelligent Sys., Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d
1773, 1775 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990) (finding that plaintiff employed reasonable measures to protect its
trade secrets when plaintiff limited access to premises by personally escorting visitors while on site,
video monitoring doors and parking lots, and requiring photo identification badges).
75 See, e.g., Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1004-05 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (noting
that plaintiff used safeguards internally with its own employees but failed to do so with prospective
supplier); Carboline Co. v. Lebeck, 990 F. Supp. 762, 767-68 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (noting that plaintiff
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4. Digital Misappropriation
When alleged misappropriation occurs by electronic means, many
cases analyzing reasonable precautions nonetheless continue to focus on
traditional facilities-based security measures.76 Thus, for instance, courts
generally examine the use of non-disclosure agreements, steps to secure the
facility, notice to employees about protecting trade secrets, and the use of
passwords.77 In more recent cases, however, courts are beginning to pay
more attention to technical protection measures, going beyond the use of
traditional measures.78 In such recent circumstances, steps omitted can be
just as important as steps taken.79 For instance, in a case where an employee
downloaded a file consisting of a nine-hundred-page electronic document
that allegedly contained trade secrets, the plaintiff argued that its efforts to
protect the file were reasonable because it
(1) required its employees to sign confidentiality agreements that covered "this sort of infor-
mation," (2) it was available only to [plaintiffs] employees on its password- and firewall-
protected main network, and (3) because [plaintiff] instituted physical security measures to
make sure no outsiders could access it.80
The court disagreed, however, noting that the plaintiff failed to show that it
(1) labeled the file confidential or otherwise communicated the confidentiality of the ... file
directly to its employees, (2) directed its employees to maintain the secrecy of the file (other
than through a general confidentiality agreement which did not expressly mention the ...
file), or (3) tracked or otherwise regulated the use of [the] file."'
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs efforts were not reasonable
under the circumstances.
Unfortunately, the only thing consistent about the way in which the
courts analyze reasonable efforts in these digital misappropriation cases is
the inconsistency in both the approach and outcomes. In one case, the court
found that the plaintiff had taken reasonable measures to protect a trade
secret that was kept on a computer and protected by a password because the
plaintiff used licensing agreements, a password protected Web site, and
required employees to sign confidentiality agreements and limited their access to secret data on its
computer system, but did not use adequate safeguards in circulating the information to customers).
76 See, e.g., Schalk v. State, 767 S.W.2d 441,447-48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), afld, 823 S.w.2d 633
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (defendant accused of stealing computer programs).
77 Id.
78 See, e.g., Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1334-35 (N.D. Ga.
2007).
79 See id. at 1335.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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generally kept the secrets out of the public display at conventions.8 2 In an-
other case, a court found that the use of encrypted e-mail to transmit the
alleged trade secret and password protection were insufficient to meet the
requirement given the lack of other security measures.83 Still, other courts
do not address the issue directly, disposing of the cases on other grounds.84
5. The Four Seasons Illustration
The facts of Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B. V. v. Consorcio Barr,
S.A. s5 provide a vivid and dramatic illustration of digital misappropriation.
The story occurs mostly in Caracas, Venezuela, where the corporate defen-
dant, Consorcio, is the owner of the building which housed the Four Sea-
sons Hotel Caracas.86 Consorcio entered into various agreements with Four
Seasons Hotels whereby the Four Seasons would manage the operations of
the hotel and license its brand name and trademarks to Consorcio in con-
nection with the operation of the hotel.87 Pursuant to these agreements,
while Consorcio could have received from Four Seasons hard copy print-
outs of guest histories upon request, it was not entitled to any of the pro-
prietary electronic data that Four Seasons considered trade secret informa-
tion, such as detailed guest information in databases and financial manage-
ment information.88
When Four Seasons refused to grant Consorcio access to this informa-
tion, Consorcio took drastic measures to obtain the information. To begin
with,
a group of Consorcio's personnel, including armed security guards, forcibly entered the Four
Seasons' computer systems room ... [and u]nder the pretext of self-executing a Venezuelan
court order ... downloaded onto back-up tapes all of the guest information and data stored
electronically on [one of Four Seasons' servers] in Caracas, as well as all of the financial in-
formation and data stored electronically on [another Four Seasons] server.89
82 QSRSoft, Inc. v. Rest. Tech. Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1297, 1303 (N.D. 11. 2006).
83 Heartland Home Fin., Inc. v. Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp., No. 1:05CV2659, 2007 WL
436048, at *4-5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2007), affd, 258 F. App'x 860 (6th Cir. 2008).
84 See, e.g., Twin Vision Corp. v. Bellsouth Commc'n Sys., Inc., 152 F.3d 929, 1998 WL 385135,
at *3 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) ("We need not decide whether encryption alone is
adequate evidence that [plaintiff] made a reasonable effort to preserve the secrecy of its factory access
code because we find that it has not met its burden in regard to misappropriation.").
85 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1271-72 (S.D. Fla. 2003), affd in part, revd in part sub nom. Four
Seasons Hotels v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 138 F. App'x 297 (11 th Cir. 2005).
86 Id. at 1271-72.
87 Id. at 1272.
88 Id. at 1280-81.
89 Id. at 1279-80.
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Consorcio personnel (more specifically, the former assistant to the Four
Seasons' Manager of Information Technology) then transferred the down-
loaded information to a laptop, and using the Four Seasons' IT Director's
password gained full access to the databases.9"
Prior to that time, Consorcio also took other steps to acquire Four Sea-
sons' proprietary data by, for instance, intercepting the hotel's e-mail com-
munications9 and using a program to attempt to crack Four Seasons' pass-
words.92 Consorcio also hired Bencomo, the former Assistant Systems Ad-
ministrator at the Four Seasons,93 who came equipped with inside knowl-
edge of the Four Seasons computer networks, as well as the administrative
and user passwords.94 A forensic examination of Bencomo's laptop revealed
thirty-eight e-mails sent to Consorcio that contained Four Seasons' data in
encrypted spreadsheets.95 Bencomo was also believed to have engaged in
"spoofing" to access the Four Seasons network.9 6 As described in the case,
spoofing occurs when a person, in attempting to gain access to a network,
sets up a fake internet protocol ("IP") address which is not traceable back to
their own IP address.97 Not surprisingly, the court found Consorcio liable
for misappropriation.98
While not all trade secret misappropriation cases are this dramatic,
misappropriation through technology occurs regularly and often surrepti-
tiously.99 The next Part discusses the ways in which trade secrets have be-
come more vulnerable because of the use of technological tools in the
workplace. The Part examines some of the tools that augment the ease with
which trade secrets can be stored, accessed, and disseminated.
II. THE DIGITAL WORLD
Computers are present in virtually every workplace. A reported sev-
enty-seven million people use a computer at work.' Employees most often
use computers to access the Intemet or to communicate by e-mail,' the
very kinds of conduct that could quickly disseminate trade secrets. The em-
90 Id. at 1281, 1283.
91 Four Seasons, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1289.
92 Id. at 1292.
9' Id. at 1293.
94 Id. at 1293, 1294-95.
9' Id. at 1296.
96 Id. at 1298.
97 Four Seasons, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1298, 1304.
98 Id. at 1325.
99 See infra Parts II.A. and II.B.1.
100 Press Release, Dep't. of Labor, Computer and Internet Use at Work Summary (Aug. 2, 2005),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ciuaw.nr0.htm.
101 Id.
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ployer's workplace has also expanded into homes, as approximately twelve
million1 2 employees work full-time from home as telecommuters, an in-
creasing trend in recent years. 3 Management, professional, and sales em-
ployees are especially likely to use technology in the workplace and also
are among those most likely to telecommute."°
The digital world complicates the protection of trade secret informa-
tion and increases the likelihood of destroying trade secret status of misap-
propriated information. 5 This is because information in digital form can be
stored and processed in so many ways that it becomes very difficult to track
and control.0 6 There is a tension between the need to keep information se-
cret and modem technological methods that allow the information to be
easily accessed, reproduced, and disseminated. Of course, the social benefit
of modem technology is perhaps incalculable. Nevertheless, information
breaches occur most commonly through such activities as "unauthorized
access to information, loss of laptop and mobile devices, theft of proprie-
tary information, and insider e-mail abuses," and more than half of these
breaches occur as a result of corporate mismanagement of the information
or from insiders who abuse their access."0 7 A 2008 report of data breaches to
date revealed that most were the result of lost or stolen laptops, hard drives
or thumb drives, and the posting of sensitive data on Web sites or distribu-
tion through e-mail.0 8
Unlike the traditional options of file cabinets or boxes, laptops, per-
sonal digital assistants ("PDAs"), cell phones, Universal Serial Bus
("USB")'0 9 flash drives, portable hard drives, iPods, and MP3 players are
among the many possible locations where one might download and store
electronic information."0 As even Congress observed, "[c]omputer technol-
ogy enables rapid and surreptitious duplications of the information. Hun-
dreds of pages of information can be loaded onto a small computer diskette,
102 Alison Grant, Taking a Big Risk: Surge in Telecommuters Creates New Twists, Novel Legal
Questions and Employer Problems, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 4, 2007, at GI ("More than 12
million Americans are full-time telecommuters, and another 33 million do at least part of their job at
home, according to the nonprofit WorldatWork.").
103 Sue Shellenbarger, Some Companies Rethink the Telecommuting Trend, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28,
2008, at Dl (noting that from 2005 to 2007 there was a 30 percent increase in the number of full-time
employees working from home).
104 See Grant, supra note 102, at G1.
105 Robert P. Green & Glenn Dickinson, Inside Job: Without the Right IP Protection Internal
Abuse is a Fear-Inducing Threat, CAL. CPA, July 2007, at 19.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Brian Krebs, Data Breaches Hit 8.3 Million Records in First Quarter, WASH. POST, Apr. 3,
2008, at D3.
109 Universal Serial Bus drive is a type of serial bus that allows peripheral devices such as disks,
modems, printers, digitizers, and data gloves to be easily connected to a computer. Joseph Kahn, Be-
tween Wall Street and Silicon Valley, a New Lexicon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000, at C 1.
110 Green & Dickinson, supra note 105, at 19.
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placed into a coat pocket, and taken from the legal owner.'. While this
Article focuses on trade secret misappropriation, there may be other causes
of action available where a computer has been used inappropriately to
transmit or intercept information." 2
A. Easier Storage and Accessibility
While once it might have required several file cabinet drawers filled
with paper to store sensitive business information, today that information
can be stored in a single spreadsheet or document, or stored on a com-
puter's hard drive. It can then be downloaded onto a USB thumb drive,
which is literally about the size of one's thumb, and connected to another
computer anywhere to read the information. This means that for someone
intending to steal the information, instead of having to photocopy hundreds
of pages of documents and load them into boxes or folders to leave the
building, it is a simple matter to either download the information, within
seconds, onto a thumb size storage device that fits easily into a pocket, or
attach the information to an e-mail sent to an outside account where it can
later be easily retrieved.
The risk of misappropriation involving these new storage devices is al-
ready evident in trade secret misappropriation cases. For example, in one
case, an employee misappropriated his employer's trade secrets by down-
loading the equivalent of 1.5 million pages of raw text onto two USB
drives."3 The employee attached a thumb drive to his desktop computer
... S. REP. No. 104-359, at 6(1996).
112 For instance, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") prohibits accessing a computer
without authorization to obtain information. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). The phrase "without authoriza-
tion" is not defined in the Act and it is questionable whether it would cover an employee who at the time
of accessing the information was permitted to access the computers, even if the later use of the informa-
tion were unauthorized. See Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1341-44
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (recognizing a split among the courts on the interpretation of "without authorization,"
but holding that "a violation does not depend upon the defendant's unauthorized use of information, but
rather upon the defendant's unauthorized use of access."). It may therefore be applicable where employ-
ees use the employer's computer to send "unauthorized" e-mail with confidential information to others,
including prospective new employers. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. The CFAA provides both criminal and civil
remedies, including a private right of action against a person who intentionally causes damage to a
protected computer. Id. § 1030(g), (a)(5)(A). A "protected computer" is a computer "which is used in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the
United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of
the United States." Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B). In addition, use of e-mail to encourage an employee to reveal
trade secrets can be prosecuted as wire fraud insofar as it comprises a scheme to defraud the employer.
Id. § 1343. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") may also apply where one inter-
cepts, or endeavors to intercept, any electronic communication. Id. § 2511 (1)(a).
113 Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Davis, No. H-06-2849, 2006 WL 3837518, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
28, 2006).
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several times before his departure in order to copy files, which he then
transferred to the desktop computer at his new employer and also onto the
new employer's computer servers." 4
In another case, a departing employee transferred, among other things,
a sensitive five-hundred-page document to his home computer while work-
ing for the plaintiff, but after he had already accepted employment from the
plaintiffs principal competitor."5 The employee made the transfer by
downloading the files from his employer's computer system to a zip drive
and then later transferring the information from the zip drive to his home
computer. ' In yet another case, an employee provided confidential cus-
tomer lists on a USB drive to a competitor." 7 Thus, the very ease with
which large amounts of information can now be stored rapidly, transported
quickly, and later accessed in the original format provides greater incentive
and opportunity for it to be removed.
The use of servers to consolidate, store, and publish information can
also pose risks to trade secrets. Information that previously might have been
locked away in dusty file cabinets scattered across many offices, or even
the globe, can now be accessed immediately by every employee in an orga-
nization." 8 Employees can then download a wide range of information onto
personal laptops or miniaturized storage devices." 9 Wireless networks are
popular because of the lower cost and greater convenience that they offer
relative to wired connections.'20 Unfortunately, these wireless networks are
much more vulnerable to intrusion than hard-wired networks and pose high
security risks if left unprotected.' 2
Finally, laptop computers epitomize information portability. They en-
able employees to take valuable data to any location. When an employee
connects her corporate laptop to wireless networks such as public Wi-Fi'22
114 id.
115 Diamond Power, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
116 Id. at 1330.
117 AirDefense, Inc. v. AirTight Networks, Inc., No. C 05-04615JF, 2006 WL 2092053, at *1
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2006).
118 See, e.g., Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268,
1283 (S.D. Fla. 2003), affd in part, revd in part sub nom. Four Seasons Hotels v. Consorcio Barr S.A.,
138 F. App'x 297 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("The Lotus Notes server was connected to all of the servers for all
Four Seasons' worldwide to allow e-mail communication. Aside from that, it also provided access to
Four Seasons' corporate databases which provided other information.").
119 See, e.g., Liebert Corp. v. Mazur, 827 N.E.2d 909, 917 (I11. App. Ct. 2005) (employee down-
loaded sensitive pricing information from company server onto his laptop computer).
120 See Anita Ramasastry, Jane K. Winn & Peter Winn, Will Wi-Fi Make Your Private Network
Public? Wardriving, Criminal and Civil Liability, and the Security Risks of Wireless Networks, I
SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 9 (2005).
121 id.
122 "Wi-Fi is the wireless equivalent of [a] wired internal local area network" and it permits a
connection to the Internet. PCMag.com, Wi-Fi Definition from PC Magazine Encyclopedia, http://www.
pcmag.com/encyclopedia-term/0,2542,t=Wi-Fi&i=54444,00.asp (last visited Aug. 9, 2009).
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connections or "hot spots,"'23 information stored on the laptop is susceptible
to hackers.'24 In addition, the theft of a laptop can expose a company's most
sensitive information to misappropriation, posing challenges to data secu-
rity and trade secret protection. For instance, the personal data of about
twenty-six million veterans and military troops was recently exposed when
a burglar stole a laptop from the home of an employee of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs.'25 If this kind of theft led to a large scale exposure
of trade secrets, it could be devastating to a company, as the trade secret
protection in all of the now public data would be lost.
Companies should therefore pay closer attention to laptop security and
to policies governing employees' use of laptops. Boeing Co., for instance,
"requires employees to access most sensitive information through company
servers instead of downloading the data to a laptop . . . [and] employees
working with payroll data must use a cable lock to physically secure their
laptops to a desk at all times. '  ING America requires the installation of
encryption software'27 on all laptops before they can leave the premises.2
Both of these companies' laptop policies resulted from having suffered re-
cent, high profile laptop thefts; 29 with trade secrets there are no second
chances at protection once the secrets have been exposed. 3 °
123 A hot spot is the "geographic boundary covered by a Wi-Fi ... wireless access point."
PCMag.com, Hot Spot Definition from PC Magazine Encyclopedia, http://www.pcmag.com/
encyclopedia term/0,2542,t=HotSpot&i=44405,00.asp (last visited Aug. 9, 2009).
124 See Paola Singer, A Secure Laptop on the Go, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2008, at Dl.
125 Pamela Yip, Firms Ready to Put Leash on Laptops, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 15, 2006.
126 Id.
127 Encryption software changes plain text into non-readable form, requiring a "key" to decrypt the
information. It provides enhanced security because if the information is intercepted in transit and the
receiver does not have the appropriate key, the encrypted information will generally be unreadable.
WiseGeek.com, What is Encryption?, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-encryption.htm (last visited
Aug. 10, 2009).
128 Yip, supra note 125.
129 The Boeing thefts, which occurred in November 2005 and April 2006, exposed thousands of
current and former employees' social security numbers and addresses. The ING laptop stolen in June
2006 contained retirement plan information on 13,000 employees. Id.
130 As of the writing of this Article, I am not aware of any trade secret losses as a result of stolen
laptops. However, this may be explained by the fact that such instances would not be reported. Compa-
nies have no incentives to report this kind of trade secret theft since it could cause embarrassment to the
company and might lead to other kinds of losses as well, such as a drop in stock prices. Privacy laws and
state breach notification laws require disclosures when companies suffer data security breaches. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2008), N.Y. GEN. BuS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney 2008), DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-102 (2008), ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (2008). However, no such manda-
tory disclosure is in place for trade secret losses.
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B. Easier Dissemination
Trade secret law only protects secret information.' With the click of a
mouse or the push of a button, e-mail, the Internet, and even cell phones
can expose trade secrets to potentially millions of people within seconds.
Once a trade secret becomes public, its owner may be rendered powerless
to stop third parties, including competitors, from using it, and the trade se-
cret owner also faces the complete loss of trade secret status.'32 Accord-
ingly, the grave risks posed by these technologies cannot be left unad-
dressed.
1. E-Mail
One need not even attach a physical device to a work computer to
transfer information. E-mail can transfer most files and other data with little
effort. Furthermore, even without attachments, information can also be ex-
changed in the text of the message. Many trade secret cases involve em-
ployees transmitting files containing trade secret information through e-
mails. For example, in a case prosecuted under the EEA,'33 a product devel-
opment manager gained access to secret product information belonging to a
customer of his former employer.'34 After he later accepted new employ-
ment from a competitor of that customer, he downloaded the secret infor-
mation and e-mailed it to his new employer.'35 In another case, an engineer
with knowledge of secret software source codes was terminated from
work.'36 In resentment, he sent e-mail messages to several competitors of
his former employer, offering the secret software source codes for sale.'37
The terminated employee sent all of the messages from an alias e-mail ac-
131 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("Information that is public
knowledge or that is generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret."); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) ("The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be
of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business.").
132 See Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 134 (Kan. 1972) ("Once the secret is pub-
lished to the 'whole world' . . . it loses its protected status and becomes available to others for use and
copying without fear of legal reprisal from the original possessor.").
133 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
134 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Silicon Valley Engineer Indicted for Stealing Trade Secrets and
Computer Fraud (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
zhanglndict.htm.
135 Id.
136 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Former Engineer of White Plains Software Company Receives
Two Years in Prison for Theft of Trade Secret (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/kissaneSent.htm.
137 id.
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count at a public library in order to mask the sender's identity. 38 To his
surprise, the competitor brought those messages to the attention of his for-
mer employer.'39 His identity was eventually revealed when the FBI's
Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Squad detected accesses to the
alias e-mail account through his home Internet connection. 140
Trade secret information can also be transmitted by employees from
their corporate e-mail account to their private e-mail accounts and to com-
petitors. 14 In a case that made headlines recently, seven former Citibank
employees were accused of e-mailing secret client data from work to their
personal e-mail addresses before leaving to join a competitor.'42 As a result
of these bankers' use of Citibank's trade secret information to lure away
clients, Citibank is alleged to have lost about $50 million of business. 43
In another example, a researcher who was responsible for developing
and manufacturing veterinary diagnostic kits for IDEXX became dissatis-
fied with her job and began to consider leaving the company. 144 As part of
her plan to find new employment, she exchanged e-mails with a competitor
who tried to lure her away with promises of potential employment opportu-
nities. 45 During her e-mail exchanges with the competitor, the researcher
disclosed proprietary company information and transmitted to the competi-
tor software and computer files containing a variety of IDEXX trade se-
crets. 146 Ironically, the researcher's activities were only discovered after she
accidentally sent her supervisor one of the e-mails-addressed to the com-
petitor-that contained the company's trade secret files. 47 The employer's
discovery was especially fortuitous because the dissatisfied employee had
resigned from the company the day before she inadvertently sent the e-mail
to her former supervisor. 14 Absent her mistake, it is very unlikely that she
would have been caught.
Instant messaging is on the rise in the workplace, providing what e-
mail does not: real-time conversations and an indication of which contacts
are available at a given time." 9 Messaging poses the same kinds of security
risks as e-mail, and it is estimated that about one-third of employees in the
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 id.
141 See, e.g., Posdata Co. v. Kim, No. C-07-02504 RMW, 2007 WL 1848661, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal.
June 27, 2007).
142 Nur Dianah Suhaimi, Stealing Office Data? Computer Forensics Can Track You Down,
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 27, 2008.
143 id.
144 United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 6 (1 st. Cir. 2000).
141 Id. at 7.
146 Id. at 8.
147 Id. at 10.
148 Id.
149 Carola Mamberto, Instant Messaging Invades the Office, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2007, at BI.
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United States use instant messaging, often without the knowledge of their
employers. 5 ' The security risks posed by instant messaging is a concem."'
Some companies may choose to restrict instant messaging to intra-company
communication between company employees rather than allowing the use
of the public instant messaging network that can be vulnerable to inappro-
priate outsider access."' Other companies may decide to block employees'access to instant messaging at work all together.'53
2. The Internet
Approximately 1.4 billion people use the Internet, and it is undoubt-
edly a powerful communication tool. 154 It has changed the way in which the
world does business, and many companies today rely on computers and the
Internet to survive.'55 Furthermore, employees access. the Internet not only
from their workplaces, but from home as well, as over 50 percent of all
households are connected to the Internet. 56
However, the Internet is a dangerous place for trade secrets.'57 Many
courts assume that a trade secret posted on the Internet is generally known
and consequently has lost its trade secret status. 58 Even when a party post-
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., Employers Fail to Manage Instant Messaging, Says Survey, OUT-LAW NEWS, May
18, 2005, http://www.out-law.com/page-5713 (reporting on a survey in the United Kingdom that re-
vealed 16 percent of employees used instant messaging to send or receive sensitive company materials).
152 See, e.g., Nathan Eddy, Concentric Offers Secure Messaging for MSBs, EWEEK.COM, Mar. 24,
2009, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Midmarket/Concentric-Offers-Secure-Messaging-for-SMBs-812940.
153 See, e.g., John E. Dunn, Worried Companies Block Facebook, ABC NEWS, Aug. 21, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/PCWorld/story?id=3505273; Shawn Young, Security Fears Prod
Many Firms to Limit Staff Use of Web Services, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at Al (mentioning General
Electric Co. and J.P. Morgan Chase Co. as companies that have banned instant messaging in the work-
place).
154 See Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 12-15 (2008)
(statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President, Cisco Sys., Inc.).
155 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network Theory Approach to Inter-
net Jurisdiction through Data Privacy, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 493, 499 (2004) (discussing trends in the
Internet economy).
156 See Daniel W. Park, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment, and Patent Law: A Collision on the
Information Superhighway, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 46,47 (2004).
157 Parts of this subpart are adapted from Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on
the Internet through Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2007) [hereinafter
Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures].
158 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., No. C-95-20091 RMW,
1997 WL 34605244, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1997); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362,
1368 (E.D. Va. 1995); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93 (Ct. App.
2004). But see id. at 190 (finding that the mere posting of information on the Intemet does not destroy a
trade secret).
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ing 15 9 trade secret information may not have intended to cause harm to the
trade secret owner, the nature of the Internet is such that the secret could
nonetheless be destroyed. 6 '
Unlike other mass media, the Internet has no editors who scrutinize
submissions and decide what materials will be published. Any person sit-
ting at a computer can post proprietary information onto the Internet, result-
ing in immediate and irreparable harm. One judge captured the problem in
these words:
The court is troubled by the notion that any Internet user... can destroy valuable intellectual
property rights by posting them over the Internet, especially given the fact that there is little
opportunity to screen postings before they are made. Nonetheless, one of the Intemet's vir-
tues, that it gives even the poorest individuals the power to publish to millions of readers can
also be a detriment to the value of intellectual property rights. The anonymous (or judgment
proof) defendant can permanently destroy valuable trade secrets, leaving no one to hold li-
able for the misappropriation.
61
The nature of the Internet is such that the trade secret owner may never
know the identity of the person making the disclosure. Furthermore, the
person posting the information may very well be far removed from the per-
son who originally misappropriated the secret, making it difficult to even
identify potential defendants in misappropriation actions involving disclo-
sures on the Internet.
Because the value of a trade secret lies in its secrecy, most misappro-
priators who acquire another's trade secrets and plan to use them for their
own competitive advantage have no incentive to publicize the secret.' The
culture of the Internet, however, has led to a higher likelihood that those in
possession of another's trade secrets will make them public, rather than
continuing to keep them secret for personal gain. The great ease with which
virtually anyone can post information on the Internet, coupled with its "dis-
159 Posting "consists of directly placing material on or in a Web site, bulletin board, discussion
group, newsgroup, or similar Internet site or 'forum,' where it will appear automatically and more or
less immediately to be seen by anyone with access to that forum." O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 72, 91 (Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, posting allows direct self-publication of information, or one
may also send information to a site, the owners or moderators of which make decisions about what to
post. See id.
160 See, e.g., Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1250, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(reversing district court dismissal, holding that the Food and Drug Administration could be liable for
misappropriation of trade secrets where it posted plaintiff's trade secrets on its Web site for five months,
and remanding).
161 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (citations omitted).
162 See, e.g., DVD Copy Control, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195 (noting that a defendant in a trade secret
case typically "has as much interest as the plaintiff has in keeping the secret away from good faith
competitors and out of the public domain").
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inhibiting effect,"' 6 3 and a general decline in employee loyalty in the work-
place,"6 have allowed disgruntled employees to achieve the ultimate re-
venge against their former employers by destroying trade secrets.
One court articulated this phenomenon in the following words: "With
the Internet, significant leverage is gained by the gadfly, who has no editor
looking over his shoulder and no professional ethics to constrain him.
Technology blurs the traditional identities of David and Goliath."' 65 Ac-
cordingly, Internet disclosures are likely to become a greater problem than
they have been in the past, and the few cases highlighted below illustrate
that a trade secret owner generally has no satisfactory recourse when trade
secrets are published on the Internet. 66
In Religious Technology Center v. Lerma,67 a disgruntled former
member of the Church of Scientology published documents taken from a
court record on the Internet. 6 ' The Church'69 considered these documents to
be trade secrets and sued the former employee, Lerma, to enjoin him from
disseminating the alleged trade secrets. 7 ' The court refused to issue the
injunction, though, because by the time the Church sought the injunction,
the documents no longer qualified as trade secrets.' 7' The court explicitly
stated that "[o]nce a trade secret is posted on the Internet, it is effectively
part of the public domain, impossible to retrieve."'72
In another Scientology case, the Church sought an injunction against
another disgruntled former member who posted Church writings on several
Internet newsgroups.'73 Despite being "troubled by the notion that any In-
ternet user ... can destroy valuable intellectual property rights by posting
them over the Internet," the court held that since the writings were posted
163 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1575 (2007) (discussing the phenomenon whereby users of the Internet
are less inhibited when expressing themselves).
164 See generally Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 540, 542 (2001); Benja-
min Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in the United States, 20 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 321, 339 (1999).
165 Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d. 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
166 For a more detailed discussion of the legal significance of the effect of trade secrets appearing
on the Internet, see Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures, supra note 159; Elizabeth A. Rowe, Intro-
ducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 1041 [hereinafter Rowe,
Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets].
167 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995).
168 Id. at 1364.
169 The Religious Technology Center is a nonprofit corporation formed by the Church of Scientol-
ogy to protect its religious course materials. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Serv.,
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
170 Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1364.
171 Id. at 1368.
172 Id.
173 Netcom, 923 F. Supp. at 1239.
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on the Internet, they were generally available to the public and therefore
there were no trade secret rights available to support an injunction.17 1
In Ford Motor Co. v. Lane,175 the defendant, Lane, operated a Web site
that contained news about Ford and its products.'76 Lane published some
documents on his Web site relating to the quality of Ford's products. 7 7 He
did so despite knowing that the documents were confidential. 78 Ford sought
a restraining order to prevent publication of the documents, claiming that
the documents were trade secrets. 179 Ultimately, however, Lane's First
Amendment defense prevailed, with the court reasoning that an injunction
to prevent Lane from publishing trade secrets would be an unconstitutional
prior restraint on speech.' 80
The advent of blogging'5 ' also poses risks, as employees and others
discuss a myriad of company-related issues in public online, not all of
which may be suitable for disclosure. Even though some employees have
been fired for blogging about work, business blogs are on the rise.8 2 Two
new blogs are created every second,'83 and an estimated 89 percent of cor-
porations are either blogging now or intend to set up blogs in the future.'84
Some blogs may even focus on breaking stories about their competitors, as
for instance, when a blog sponsored by Miller Brewing Co. revealed that
competitor Anheuser-Busch was preparing a new kind of brew.'85 Accord-
ingly, individuals or companies could be liable for trade secret misappro-
priation actions when their blogging allegedly reveals others' trade secrets.
In one case, for example, Apple Inc. sued and settled with a Web site for
publishing trade secrets and allegedly soliciting Apple employees to reveal
secrets about a new miniature Apple computer.'86 The blogging culture,
174 Id. at 1256-57.
175 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
176 Id. at 747.
177 id.
178 Id. at 748.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 750, 753. For an overview of First Amendment issues presented by trade secret disclo-
sures on the Intemet see Rowe, Introducing a Takedownfor Trade Secrets, supra note 168, at 1071-74.
181 Blogs are Web sites that contain commentary or other entries written by one or multiple authors
on a particular topic. See Michael J. DeMaria, Blogs: Only Half-Baked, NETWORK COMPUTING, Sept.
30, 2002, at 19.
182 See generally Matt Villano, Blogging the Hand that Feeds You, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, at
G5.
183 Steve Johnson, I Blog, Therefore I Am; With 175,000 New Ones Created Every Day, Blogs
About to Join the Mainstream, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 2006, at 1.
184 GUIDEWIRE GROUP, BLOGGING IN THE ENTERPRISE: A GUIDEWIRE GROUP MARKET CYCLE
SURVEY 2 (2005), http://www.guidewiregroup.com/site/pdf/CorporateBloggingSurvey.pdf.
185 David Kesmodel, For All You Do, Bud, This Blog's For You, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2008, at
Al.
186 See Bray, supra note 5.
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generally unrestricted by editors and gatekeepers, sets the stage for the easy
dissemination of trade secret information, even if inadvertent.
3. Cellular Phones
Cellular ("cell") phones are another potential source for the dissemina-
tion of trade secrets. About 87 percent of those living in the United States
today use a cell phone, 87 a dramatic increase from the 38 percent who used
cell phones in December 2000.188 Today's phones combine camera, e-mail,
and Internet capability in one small device, and have become ubiquitous.'89
As a result, they can serve as a great tool for stealing and transmitting com-
pany secrets. These increased risks have led security-conscious organiza-
tions, and even countries, to ban or limit the use of cell phones. Saudi Ara-
bia and North Korea have apparently banned the importation and sale of
camera phones in an effort to protect government secrets. 9° The U.S. Air
Force has also banned camera phones from all areas that contain classified
information.' 9 ' Companies like General Motors and Texas Instruments have
instituted policies limiting the use of camera phones by visitors and em-
ployees on company premises."' Samsung Electronics, the former Daim-
lerChrysler, and BMW also prohibit camera phones at some manufacturing
sites.'93 In addition to the risks that cell phones may be used to capture trade
secrets, smart phones'94 (which have many of the same functions as a desk-
187 This is according to 2008 figures compiled by the International Association for the Wireless
Telecommunications Industry. See CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION, WIRELESS QUICK FACTS,
YEAR END FIGURES [hereinafter CTIA YEAR END FIGURES], http:!/ctia.org/advocacy/research/
index.cfmI/AID/1 0323 (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
188 U.S. Census data noted that there were 158,722,000 cell phone subscribers in 2003, compared
to more recent 2008 industry figures at 270,300,000. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008, 714, tbl. 1120 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2007pubs/08statab/infocomm.pdf, with CTIA YEAR END FIGURES, supra note 187.
189 See, e.g., Teresa M. McAleavy, Camera Phones Pose Problems for Workplace Privacy and
Security, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 2004, at EO.
190 Jon Van, Hear Me Now, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2005, at CNI; Saudis Ban Use of Cell-Phone
Cameras, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.foxnews.con/story/0,2933,134091,00.html;
ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 347-49 (Ronald Deibert
et al. eds., 2008).
191 Van, supranote 190, at CNI.
192 Id.
193 See McAleavy, supra note 189, at EO 1.
194 "A Smartphone combines the functions of a cellular phone and a handheld computer in a single
device." Michael Juntao Yuan, What Is a Smartphone, O'REILLY NET, Aug. 23, 2005,
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/wireless/2005/08/23/whatissmartphone.html.
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top computer) are also at risk of being infected with viruses and other mali-
cious software.'95
The widespread use of cell phones and the other technological tools
discussed above suggest that trade secret owners need an infrastructure in
place to protect their secrets--one that includes specific processes and
technological measures. Conducting a risk analysis of potential threats to
the company's trade secrets should be comprehensive, paying attention to
people, processes, and technology. Reliance on technological measures
alone will not be sufficient. At a minimum, companies should give careful
deliberation to policies regarding remote access to company computer net-
works and systems, telecommuting, e-mail and Internet usage, and access
rights to sensitive information.'96
III. SHOULD REASONABLENESS BE REDEFINED IN LIGHT OF KNOWN
TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS?
As the earlier discussion illustrates, the widespread use of technology
in the workplace enhances the risks of trade secret misappropriation
through electronic means.'97 This Article posits that these risks are foresee-
able to a trade secret owner, and that a court in determining reasonableness
should deem it relevant to consider what specific security precautions were
utilized to protect a secret in light of those risks. Because this argument
draws on contributory negligence principles, a brief summary of the es-
sence of that defense is in order here. The contributory negligence defense
in tort law bars a plaintiff from recovery when her own conduct in protect-
ing herself falls below that of a reasonable person in like circumstances and
that conduct was a substantial factor in causing her injury.' 8 Thus, as ap-
plied here, where the trade secret plaintiff is in the best position to decide
whether to risk being injured, or at least the extent of that risk based on the
precautions it selects, it seems sensible to allocate the burden of that choice
to the plaintiff.'99
195 Joseph De Avila, Do Hackers Pose a Threat to Smart Phones?, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at
DI.
196 See Antony J. McShane & Sarah E. Smith, Implement an Effective Trade Secret Protection
Plan-Before It's Too Late, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July 2003, at 16.
197 See supra Part II.
198 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463. The comparative negligence defense
is inconsistent with trade secret law principles and is also inapplicable here because it focuses more on
damages than on liability. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 470 (W. Page Keeton et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1984). While it may be of some use in analyzing the defendant's conduct as part of the
misappropriation question, it does not appear to have a role in the threshold question of whether reason-
able efforts were employed, thus qualifying the information as a trade secret
199 See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 165 (discussing conscious reasonable risk-taking).
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This is consistent with existing trade secret law principles as even the
modem codification of trade secret law in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition provides that the "foreseeability of the conduct through which
the secret was acquired" should be relevant to determining reasonable-
ness.2"0 Furthermore, trade secret law already provides (under the UTSA)
that a putative trade secret owner cannot make out a claim for trade secret
misappropriation unless it can show reasonable efforts to protect the se-
cret.01 That is because in most jurisdictions, the reasonable efforts require-
ment is part of the threshold question in determining whether the plaintiff
owns a legally protectable trade secret.202
To be clear, this Article does not advocate changing the reasonable ef-
forts requirement. Rather, because the requirement mandates consideration
of what is reasonable under the circumstances, the argument is that the
changing circumstances that have come about as a result of new technology
require a reexamination of what security measures are reasonable. Reason-
ableness requires not necessarily a checklist of specific items, but a con-
scious, risk assessment approach that better anticipates and ultimately stems
the inappropriate dissemination or disclosure of the secrets. This reflects
both a normative and prescriptive observation about the appropriate direc-
tion for digital misappropriation cases. It is especially important given that
the courts do not appear to be considering specific technical measures and
processes in the reasonable efforts analysis, and because the case law is
unsettled on this question.2"3 Further, because trade secret law and the defi-
nition of trade secret itself (even more than the other areas of intellectual
property) is based on "evolving concepts and ideas,"20 4 a reexamination of
what are reasonable measures to protect information based on current busi-
ness norms is not only logical but is consistent with trade secret law.
To that end, this Article proposes guidelines for the reasonable efforts
determination in digital misappropriation cases. 05 Courts should pay greater
attention to the technical measures and processes that companies use to
protect their trade secrets, rather than merely focusing on the traditional
facilities-based measures. In light of the foreseeability of the greater dan-
gers posed by technology, reasonableness requires evidence of a risk analy-
sis and steps to address those risks. Trade secret owners must avoid ex post
facto justifications and explanations for trade secret protection and instead
show affirmative measures generated from conscious recognition and as-
sessment of the need to protect putative trade secrets.
200 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c. (1995).
201 See supra notes 36-41.
202 id.
203 See supra Part I.B.4.
204 United States v. Kai-Lo Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
205 See infra Part III.A.
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A. Introducing Greater Objectivity into the Analysis
This Article recommends that courts reinforce a transparent, objective
layer into the reasonable efforts analysis. As it currently stands, a trade se-
cret owner impliedly makes a subjective judgment as to the reasonableness
of its safety precautions in deciding which safety measures to implement,
and which to reject. This determination probably entails, among other
things, a cost-benefit analysis, where the owner weighs the costs of protec-
tion relative to the value of the secret.2"6 However, it is the court that ulti-
mately decides whether those steps were reasonable enough under the cir-
cumstances, thus injecting an objective standard that trumps the trade secret
owner's subjective belief about the sufficiency of its security measures.
When, however, courts merely defer to the trade secret owner's judgment
without making an independent evaluation and subjecting it to scrutiny, the
required objectivity is missing. Accordingly, the guidelines proposed below
will help to ensure that the fact finders' objective analysis of reasonableness
is more meaningful. The fact finder must determine whether additional
measures were necessary to protect the putative trade secrets in light of the
particular circumstances. On the surface, this bears some resemblance to the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis in criminal procedure,2 7 where
the reasonableness of the defendant's expectation of privacy must be one
"that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. '' 20 8
As a matter of policy, a truly objective standard encourages trade se-
cret holders who would likely under-protect to take more precautions, thus
avoiding some of the problems that could be caused by the moral hazard
phenomenon.2 9 More specifically, without greater objective oversight, trade
secret holders will likely under-protect because of the costs associated with
additional measures and because they may have no incentive to take more
than the minimum precautions sufficient to achieve trade secret status under
a subjective standard. Thus, in this context, there would be no incentive to
spend more on technological measures to protect the trade secret if, for in-
206 See Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation, supra note 55, at 473.
207 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). While there may be
parallels between the Fourth Amendment's reasonable expectation of privacy standard and trade se-
crecy's reasonable efforts requirement, ultimately I do not think it appropriate to adopt these Fourth
Amendment principles in wholesale fashion into the reasonable efforts analysis. See Note, Trade Secret
Misappropriation, supra note 55, at 465-72 (explaining the shortcomings in applying the Fourth
Amendment analogy to trade secret law).
208 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). It is worth noting that in direct parallel to the
reasonable efforts requirement discussed in this Article, failure to take steps to protect one's privacy in
the Fourth Amendment context may mean that one does not receive Fourth Amendment protection. See
generally Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar
Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 392 (1997).
209 See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 (1990) (discussing moral hazard in the context of tort liability insurance).
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stance, the reasonable efforts standard merely requires traditional facilities-
based measures to secure trade secret rights. With a more meaningful objec-
tive standard, however, a trade secret holder must aim for optimal protec-
tion to not only reduce the risk of loss through misappropriation, but also to
ensure that a court will find that it acted in a reasonably prudent manner
under the circumstances.
Thus, in determining reasonableness, the court ought to not only re-
view evidence of the cost-benefit analysis that the plaintiff trade secret
owner might have considered, but also the nature of the risks involved, with
special consideration to the known technological risks that may or may not
have been considered by the trade secret owner. Factors that could aid in
that determination include: (1) the nature of the industry, (2) the nature of
the trade secrets and how they were stored, (3) the nature of the measures
taken to protect the secrets, and (4) the known risks from storage and pro-
tection choices. While some of these are interrelated, the benefit of having
each considered separately is that it allows a more comprehensive, me-
thodical, and consistent analysis of the reasonable efforts requirement in
each case, something that is currently lacking in the case law. A discussion
of each of these factors follows below.
1. Nature of the Business and the Industry
The nature of a plaintiffs business, including its size (both in terms of
personnel and financial strength), the type of services or products offered
by the business, the manner in which the business operates, and the related
question of the nature of the trade secrets are all relevant considerations. In
highly competitive industries, or industries that rely heavily on technology
to not only generate but store trade secret information, greater efforts ought
to be required to meet the reasonableness requirement."' 0 That is because
the "circumstances" would suggest that these trade secrets are particularly
vulnerable. It is noteworthy, for instance, that a majority of the victims in
cases that have been prosecuted under the EEA for trade secret theft are
technology companies in computing and engineering related fields.21'
Moreover, among the data at highest risk of theft are research and devel-
opment data, customer lists, financial data, and strategic plans and road-
maps.2"2 The size and nature of a plaintiffs business, along with cost of
210 See Scott M. Alter, Mixing Trade Secrets and LANs: Are We Looking for Trouble?, 28 COMM.
NEws (U.K.), June 1991, at 23.
211 Since 2003, ten out of thirteen prosecutions under the EEA involved theft of trade secrets from
high technology companies. See Dep't of Justice, Intellectual Property Cases, http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminaVcybercrime/ipcases.html#eea (last visited Aug. 24, 2009).
212 Bradford K. Newman, Protecting Trade Secrets: Dealing with the Brave New World of Em-
ployee Mobility, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2007, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2007-1 I-
12/newman.shtml.
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measures and the degree to which those measures could reduce the risk of
disclosure, are important in determining whether the plaintiffs choices
were reasonably prudent."'
2. Nature of the Trade Secrets and How They Were Stored
Trade secrets vary tremendously and can be virtually any kind of busi-
ness information. 2 4 Accordingly, there can be no one-size-fits-all approach
to protecting the information. Rather, storage and protection measures must
be carefully tailored to fit the particular situation. Thus, it may make a dif-
ference to the misappropriation analysis whether the purported trade secret
consists of technical specifications and source code or formula, in which
case perhaps only limited access should be granted to a select group of em-
ployees on a need-to-know basis, versus a customer list which might need
to be more widely accessible to employees with lower level access rights.
As this Article makes clear, trade secrets that are stored on a computer must
be given special protection, and attention must be paid to the accessibility
and portability of that kind of information.,1 5
In today's business environment, it is likely that at least some, if not
all, trade secrets are stored electronically. 216 As such, the traditional facili-
ties-based measures may be insufficient to protect sensitive information.
Sometimes, however, the very persons trusted with keeping information
secure can betray the trade secret owner.217 For instance, as discussed supra,
in Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts B. V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A. ,28 a mem-
ber of the Information Technology Department with responsibility for net-
work security and with total access to the system information and files,
inappropriately printed and diverted information for the benefit of the de-
fendant company.2"9 In a case such as this, there was practically no way to
avoid the misappropriation, unless perhaps there were checks in place to
protect against rogue information technology staffers. While this may cer-
tainly be advisable, a court may not, in the context of other precautions
taken by the company and in light of industry custom, consider the failure
213 In re Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875, 884 (7th Cir. 1986).
214 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
215 See Maxine S. Lans, Can You Keep the Lid on your Trade Secrets?, MARKETING NEWS, Aug.
29, 1994, at 9 (discussing practical suggestions to protect trade secrets, including computer related trade
secrets).
216 See R. Mark Halligan, Duty to Identify, Protect Trade Secrets has Arisen, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 29,
2005 (noting that "[t]rade secret assets often are created and stored electronically").
217 See supra Part I.B.5.
218 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2003), affd in part, revd in part sub nom. Four Seasons Ho-
tels v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 138 F. App'x 297 (1 Ith Cir. 2005).
219 Id. at 1283, 1290.
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to fuilly protect against internal network security personnel unreasonable.
That is because the absence of such additional measures, consistent with
contributory negligence principles,22 ° may not have been a substantial factor
in causing the misappropriation. Moreover, as stated earlier, the standard is
not one of absolute secrecy, but relative secrecy under the circumstances.22'
3. Nature of the Measures Taken to Protect the Secrets
While the reasonableness of security precautions requires a contextual
analysis based on the particular circumstances of the trade secret owner's
business, this factor evaluates the kinds of measures (beyond confidentiality
agreements and passwords) that were utilized to address the disclosure risks
from computer technology. 2 2 Effective protection of trade secret informa-
tion in this digital era requires both legal and technical approaches.223 The
goal is not perfect security, since absolute security of the information would
make its beneficial use impracticable, if not impossible. Thus, "perfect se-
curity is not optimum security. ' 224 Rather, the trade secret owner needs to
have an infrastructure in place to protect its secrets-one that includes spe-
cific processes and technological measures, in addition to the traditional
facilities-based security precautions.
Agreements that go beyond a general confidentiality agreement and
provide employees with specific notice or instructions on the use of tech-
nology in and related to the workplace can be helpful.225 At a minimum,
companies should give careful deliberation to policies regarding remote
access to company computer networks and systems, telecommuting, e-mail
and Internet usage, and access rights to sensitive information.22 6 Some com-
panies may even choose to ban camera-phones or other recording devices
where such devices could easily expose certain secrets.227
Among the available options, a trade secret owner must select those
measures that are the best fit given the preceding factors (i.e., the nature of
220 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 198, at 456.
221 See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
222 For an example of traditional (i.e., non-technological) preventive measures, see Randy Kay,
Guide to Trade Secret Protection-Maintaining Secrecy, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., June 5, 2000, at 3 1.
223 See generally McShane & Smith, supra note 196, at 16 (outlining strategies for developing a
trade secret protection program); Victoria A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in
a Digital Environment, 49 IDEA 359 (2009) (discussing practical steps to protect trade secrets in a
digital environment).
224 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991).
225 See Cundiff, supra note 223, at 370-71.
226 See McShane & Smith, supra note 196, at 16.
227 See, e.g., Dan Gillmor, Picture This, CIO INSIGHT, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.cioinsight.com/
c/a/Past-Opinions/Picture-This (discussing Samsung Electronics' ban on camera phones inside its facili-
ties).
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its business, the industry, and the particular secrets at issue). In one case, a
company required employees to sign a "Computer Security and Non-
Disclosure Agreement," agreeing to maintain usernames and passwords in
confidence. 28 Other companies provide each employee with an ID that has
to be validated with a password, and that ID is tied to a specific level of
access depending on the employee's role in the company.229 Still, others add
proprietary legends to their computer screens and mechanisms that lockout
unauthorized users. 3 °
Allowing employees to use sensitive company information, particu-
larly where the information is transferred electronically and among various
people without encrypting the information, represents weak protection.23 '
Employers should be especially mindful of employees taking unencrypted
information off site, such as on their laptops or to their offices at home. 32
The use of laptops generally should be carefully considered since it presents
many risks for data loss, including the risk that the laptops themselves
might be lost, stolen by a third party, or even sold to competitors.233
4. Known Risks from Protection Choices
As with information security generally, 234 trade secret owners should
conduct risk assessments to assure that an effective strategy or infrastruc-
ture is in place to protect allegedly valuable trade secrets. Conducting a risk
analysis of potential threats to the company's trade secrets should be com-
prehensive, paying attention to people, processes, and technology. How-
ever, reliance on technological measures alone will not be sufficient; one
major limitation is that such measures tend to be more reactive than proac-
tive.235 For instance, the mere use of a password in itself may prove too
228 Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2007). The
policy, however, did not restrict employees from transferring information to their personal computers,
and a departing employee did just that. Id. at 1329.
229 See, e.g., Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268,
1287 (S.D. Fla. 2003), affd in part, revd in part sub nom. Four Seasons Hotels v. Consorcio Barr S.A.,
138 F. App'x 297 (11th Cir. 2005).
230 See Picker Int'l Corp. v. Imaging Equip. Servs., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 18, 29 (D. Mass. 1995), affid
sub nom. Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Leavitt, 94 F.3d 640 (1st Cir. 1996).
231 Jordan Wiens, Take a Stand Against Data Loss, INFORMATIONWEEK, Nov. 19, 2007, at S I.
232 Id.
233 See supra text accompanying notes 124-26; see also Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Chicago,
Illinois Man Pleads Guilty to Theft of Trade Secrets, Offered to Sell Online Interpreter's Information
(Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/cfimina/cybercrime/sunPlea.htm (describing a case
where an employee sold a laptop containing stolen trade secrets to a competitor for three million dol-
lars).
234 See infra Part IV.
235 See CIO, GLOBAL STATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY (2007), http://www.pwc.com/en GX/gx/
information-security-survey/pdf/pwcgiss2007.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL STATE OF INFORMATION
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risky. Many employees choose passwords that are too simple, which can be
easily decrypted using free software.236 Recall, for instance, that the pass-
words were cracked in the Four Seasons237 case, allowing access to sensi-
tive data.238
In general, a decision to implement certain security measures, done in
a rational manner, suggests that certain additional measures were consid-
ered and rejected. Often it might be the case that the costs of additional
measures relative to their perceived benefits were prohibitive,239 or that
some measures would be too disruptive to the company's productivity.240
The court should consider the degree to which additional measures might
have decreased the risk of disclosure in light of the known risks posed by
the measures that were utilized. 24' To some extent, this will help create an
upper limit of sorts such that in some circumstances additional, more costly
measures will not be necessary for reasonableness, even though they may
have countered the techniques used by the misappropriator. After all, it
bears repeating that the standard is not one of absolute secrecy, but of rela-
tive secrecy, taking steps that are reasonably necessary under the circum-
stances to maintain secrecy.242 As the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Compe-
tition advises, a trade secret owner should consider the risk of the type of
conduct that may lead to loss, weighed against the cost and effectiveness of
preventive measures, and viewed in context of the information's value.243
SECURITY] (noting that information security has been too skewed toward technology rather than proac-
tive intelligence gathering and risk analysis); see also Scott Berinato, The Fifth Annual Global State of
Information Security, CIO MAC., Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://www.cio.com/article/
133600/TheFifthAnnualGlobalState of InformationSecurity (summarizing the study's findings
and conclusions).
236 See Ben Worthen, Hacker Camps Train Network Defenders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2008, at B6
(noting that "the best way to mitigate password risk is to put in additional authentication systems, such
as biometric readers that scan fingerprints, or smartcards that workers have to swipe before they're
granted access to a system").
237 Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (S.D. Fla.
2003), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part sub nom. Four Seasons Hotels v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 138 F. App'x
297 (11 th Cir. 2005).
238 See supra text accompanying note 92.
239 See Cundiff, supra note 223, at 363.
240 See id.
241 This is not to suggest that the court should conduct its own cost-benefit analysis, but that it
should scrutinize the evidence in light of the guidelines proposed here to determine whether, overall, the
decisions made by the plaintiff regarding technical precautions appear reasonable under the particular
circumstances.
242 See supra Part Il.B.l.
243 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c (1995).
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B. Defendant's Conduct as a Secondary Consideration
The defendant's conduct in obtaining the trade secret information is
not a proposed factor in the reasonable efforts determination mainly be-
cause under the UTSA and the Restatement of Torts the defendant's con-
duct is relevant to the misappropriation issue, not the threshold issue of
whether the information qualifies as a trade secret.2" Furthermore, consis-
tent with the contributory negligence framework here, the plaintiffs con-
duct is only relevant as compared to the reasonable person. Thus, the basic
outline of the approach compares what the plaintiff did to what it could
have done to protect its proprietary information.
While the defendant's utilization of improper means to access or dis-
close the trade secret could be relevant in assessing the strength of protec-
tive measures taken by the trade secret owner to protect the secret, it mud-
dies the analysis to give it too much weight and is perhaps best considered
in the context of the factors described above. For instance, depending on the
facts of the particular case, in considering the nature of measures taken to
protect the secret and the known risks from protection choices (factors three
and four), evidence of the defendant's conduct in accessing, using, or dis-
closing the alleged trade secret could be relevant to the overall evaluation of
what additional measures the plaintiff could have used. Also, where a plain-
tiff makes a strong showing of reasonable efforts to protect trade secret
information, a court is more likely to infer that the defendant used improper
means to obtain the information.245
By way of illustration, assume a trade secret owner decides to protect
sensitive data stored on a company network by requiring that only high-
level employees sign general confidentiality agreements and not requiring
special passwords to access the data. If a low-level employee who did not
sign the confidentiality agreement, but who had access to the trade secret on
the computer, e-mails it to a competitor, based on the framework presented
in this Article, a court could find such efforts to be unreasonable and that
the data does not deserve trade secret protection. In coming to this conclu-
sion on reasonableness, the court would have considered the defendant's
conduct in the context of making the judgment that, given the known risks
to electronically-stored data, the trade secret owner should have taken addi-
tional steps to protect its secrets, such as requiring passwords keyed to vari-
244 The misappropriation inquiry focuses on whether the defendant employed improper means to
acquire the trade secret. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § I (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
245 Grubbs, supra note 66, at 427; see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925
F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The greater the precautions that [plaintiff] took to maintain the secrecy
of the piece part drawings, the lower the probability that [defendant] obtained them properly and the
higher the probability that it obtained them through a wrongful act .... ").
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ous levels of access, encrypting the data, and requiring that all employees
sign confidentiality agreements.
It is interesting that the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,
which includes the reasonable efforts requirement as part of the misappro-
priation analysis, calls for an evaluation of "the extent to which the acquisi-
tion was facilitated by the trade secret owner's failure to take reasonable
precautions against discovery of the secret by the means in question." '246 It
further suggests that the "foreseeability of the conduct through which the
secret was acquired" should be relevant to determining reasonableness.247
Thus, under that framework, the foreseeability of the defendant's conduct
plays a role in the ultimate determination of whether actionable misappro-
priation occurred.
IV. SOME PRACTICAL LESSONS FROM DATA SECURITY
The challenge of protecting trade secrets should be reviewed as part of
the larger issue of data security generally, where preventing the loss of sen-
sitive data is of critical importance. "The basic tasks of identifying sensitive
data, monitoring where it goes, auditing who has access to it, and restricting
that access" are common to both data loss prevention and the protection of
trade secrets.248 Accordingly, lessons from the data security field can be
instructive, and a recent report on data security, discussed below, may pro-
vide some insights that could be helpful to trade secret protection. These
insights have also informed some of the arguments made in this Article,
particularly the view that reasonableness requires a conscious, risk assess-
ment approach that better anticipates and ultimately stems the inappropriate
dissemination or disclosure of the secrets.
CIO Magazine, CSO Magazine, and PricewaterhouseCoopers recently
conducted a worldwide survey titled The Global State of Information Secu-
rity.249 The report produced from the survey reveals several interesting
points that are relevant to the discussion about the larger issues surrounding
trade secret protection and technology. First, a majority of the companies
surveyed conduct enterprise risk assessments of their security strategy.25 °
This suggests that all companies ought to include trade secrets as part of
their security risk assessments. Trade secrets are a subset of the sensitive
commercial data that must be protected, in addition to the private consumer
information, and thus should not be left out of risk assessments. Too often,
companies do not proactively track, monitor, and protect their trade secrets
246 RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c (1995).
247 id.
248 Wiens, supra note 231, at S1.
249 See CIO, GLOBAL STATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 235.
250 Id. at 3.
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until there has been a misappropriation incident, and at that point it may be
too late.
Second, the use of technological tools such as firewalls,25' user moni-
toring, and encryption are now more widely used to protect data. 52 Having
these tools already in place and available in the workplace means that they
could be implemented in a program to secure trade secrets without too
much difficulty. However, reliance on the tools alone is not optimal, as
technological tools tend to be reactive and are not capable of the intelli-
gence and risk assessments that could avoid inappropriate access to trade
secrets in the first instance.253 It is also important to consider the people and
processes that may affect trade secret protection.
Indeed, the third point of interest from the survey is that the most
likely culprit in a "security incident," by an almost two-to-one margin, is
not a hacker, but an employee. 54 This finding provides strong support for
this Article's premise that reasonable efforts to protect trade secrets requires
a comprehensive approach that takes into consideration a trade secret
owner's measures to protect its secrets against outside threats, as well as the
often overlooked inside threats from employees. This insight also bolsters
the contention that the use of traditional security measures, which are gen-
erally facilities-based approaches, are insufficient. It makes little sense to
build taller fences when the most likely thieves are already inside.
Finally, the report notes an interesting trend in how companies have
come to view information security over the last few years: there has been a
shift from ignorance of serious flaws in computer security to awareness of
those flaws, but the final stage of using the awareness to fix the flaws has
not yet been achieved.255 To the extent that trends in trade secret protection
may be similar to those in information security, knowledge about the im-
portance of trade secret protection probably lags behind information secu-
rity. As such, the level of knowledge for trade secrets might best be classi-
fied in the phase of "ignorance moving towards awareness." Indeed, part of
the impetus for this Article is the hope that it will increase awareness of the
enhanced risks that technology poses to trade secrets, and that a more strin-
gent application of the reasonable efforts standard by the courts will even-
tually, in conjunction with other measures, compel trade secret owners to
fix the flaws that currently exist in their trade secret protection strategies.
251 A firewall protects a computer from unauthorized use or intrusion on a network. Brad Gilmer,
Broadcast Security, BROADCAST ENGINEERING (Overland Park), June 1, 2008, at 32.
252 See GLOBAL STATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 235, at 3. The large increase in the
use of encryption was noteworthy, with 72 percent reporting using some form of encryption compared
to 48 percent the previous year.
253 See id. at 5.
254 Id. at 4.
255 Id.
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CONCLUSION
What might have been a "reasonable" precaution ten years ago to pro-
tect a trade secret is not necessarily reasonable today in light of the changed
circumstances created by technology. These changes increase the risk of
trade secret misappropriation, and trade secret owners must be mindful to
have adequate security measures, both technical and process-based, to deal
with these enhanced risks. The approach presented in this Article, while
guided by and grounded in a framework of contributory negligence doc-
trine, addresses the problem from two angles. First, it aims to guide, in a
more consistent fashion through the use of objective guidelines, the way in
which courts analyze reasonableness in cases where electronically-stored
trade secrets are misappropriated. Second, this Article aims to encourage
greater awareness and vigilance by trade secret owners before the misap-
propriation occurs. Trade secret protection cannot be an afterthought.
Rather, in order to be reasonable, trade secret protection requires a more
conscious, risk assessment approach that better anticipates and ultimately
stems the inappropriate dissemination or disclosure of the secrets.

